面对面

A |     系杭州唯一连续两季度上榜区县杭州日报讯 炎炎夏日，走进焱唐能源碲化镉薄膜超大面积太阳能组件项目车间，长几十米的自动化产线正发出低沉的运转轰鸣声，这是国内首条基于自主研发的全自动化、全国产化的超大面积碲化镉薄膜太阳能组件生产线。项目负责人表示：“多亏了钱塘（新）区的项目服务机制，让我们硬生生抢出了202天，这才有现在的提前投产。    

    Wind turbines operate at a wind farm in Burqin County, Altay Prefecture, Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, on July 25, 2026. Photo: VCG
In economics, overcapacity is a dynamic and relative concept. Supply-demand balance is temporary, and imbalance is the norm. The Western narrative that equates the sheer scale of China's production capacity directly with "overcapacity" is, frankly, economically illiterate. It conflates size with pathology.
Consider the math. China's manufacturing sector accounts for roughly 30 percent of global manufacturing value-added - a dominance unmatched since the post-war US. Yet this reflects not overcapacity but competitive capacity. The critics ignore that China's trade surplus in 2025 reached a record $1.2 trillion, roughly equivalent to the GDP of a top-20 economy like Saudi Arabia. They ignore that Chinese exports carry high import content - foreign value-added accounts for nearly half of gross export value - meaning China's capacity integrates global supply chains rather than displacing them.
The judgment lacks rigor because it applies a static snapshot to a dynamic system. It assumes that if China produces more than it currently consumes domestically, the surplus is automatically "overcapacity." Nonsense. By that logic, Germany's persistent trade surplus in automobiles and machinery would constitute chronic overcapacity. It does not, because German capacity serves global demand. So does China's. The narrative isn't economics. It's politics dressed in economic jargon.
Western critics attribute the price advantages of Chinese green technology products to "government subsidies" and "market distortion." This is a convenient story. It is also wrong. The global competitiveness of China's green technology industries stems from four interconnected factors: massive domestic market scale, decades of sustained infrastructure investment, a highly educated STEM workforce, and fierce intra-industry competition. China's NEV purchase-tax exemptions, extended through 2027, total approximately 520 billion yuan ($77.05 billion). Substantial? Yes. But causally linked to overcapacity? No.
The causal chain critics imagine - subsidies → artificial competitiveness → overproduction - collapses under scrutiny. The EU's IPCEI battery programs allocated over 6 billion euros, plus EIB financing. The US CHIPS Act appropriated $54.2 billion for semiconductors, while the Inflation Reduction Act funnels hundreds of billions into clean energy. All major economies subsidize strategic industries. The difference is that China converted subsidies into systemic efficiency: its nominal lithium-ion cell capacity reached approximately 2.2 TWh by end-2023, driving global average battery pack prices down 20 percent year-on-year to $115 per kilowatt-hour in 2024. That is not distortion. That's innovation at scale.
Chinese firms filed 20,081 European patent applications in 2024 - 10.1 percent of the total, with battery technology patents surging 79 percent year-on-year. Patents reflect innovation, not subsidy dependency. The causal link between subsidies and overcapacity is weak; the link between scale, innovation, and competitiveness is robust.
Meanwhile, global demand for green and low-carbon transition is experiencing explosive growth. The International Energy Agency projects that renewable capacity additions must triple by 2030 to meet Paris Agreement targets. In this context, labeling China's wind, photovoltaic, and battery capacity as "overcapacity" is not merely wrong - it is dangerously counterproductive.
In fact, China's capacity has played an indispensable role in advancing the global energy transition. Chinese solar module production costs have fallen roughly 90 percent over the past decade. Goldman Sachs Research notes that China manufactured approximately 86 percent of global solar modules, 80 percent of lithium-ion batteries, and 68 percent of electric vehicles in 2024. This is not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets; it is capacity the world desperately needs.
The "overcapacity" label assumes a zero-sum game where Chinese production crowds out others. The reality is synergistic: Chinese capacity lowers global clean energy costs, enabling faster deployment worldwide. The "overcapacity" label holds only if one believes the world should slow decarbonization to protect less competitive producers and to empower those that deliberately employ "burn, baby, burn" tactics. That's industrial protectionism intersecting with brown imperialism, and it's disproportionately impacting the Global South, which is more vulnerable to climate breakdown, precisely when it's finally trying to shake off centuries of systemic Western exploitation and suppression.
Furthermore, the disparity in how the West treats its own industrial policy versus China's is glaring. When the US funnels $52.7 billion through the CHIPS Act for semiconductors, or when the EU subsidizes Airbus, or when American agricultural subsidies distort global food markets, the silence from Western media is deafening. When China gains an edge in manufacturing, it faces media offensives and policy restrictions.
This is not inconsistency. This is strategy. The underlying motivation is the "China threat" rubric - a framework that treats China's development itself as a danger to the Western-led order. Countries wagging their fingers at China do so not because China violates economic rules they themselves follow, but because China succeeds under rules they once wrote to their own advantage.
These accusers possess their own national industrial policies and subsidies. They have long exploited historical and contemporary advantages against China and developing countries. They have not competed well, have not provided themselves with good governance, and have not invested adequately in their own infrastructure, education, and R&D. They have allowed their own leading industries to seek monopolistic positions detrimental not only to others but to their own consumers. Rather than reform themselves, they blame China.
In these contexts, the cry of "China Shock 2.0" is the latest iteration of an old playbook: frame China's development as a threat to global stability rather than a contribution to global progress. The claim that China's advances in renewable energy and AI will send more serious shock waves than traditional manufacturing displacement is analytically flawed and politically motivated.
First, the premise is false. China is not reducing the market share of developed countries through unfair means; it is outcompeting them through innovation, scale, and efficiency. According to Goldman Sachs Research, China's "new three" green technology sectors alone contributed around one percentage point to the country's 5.4 percent nominal export growth in 2025. This is competitive capacity serving global demand, not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets.
Second, the "shock" framing ignores history. China maintained production and trade flows in 2020 while major Western economies crashed, providing essential goods to global markets, likely saving millions of lives while mitigating what would have been greater global economic harm. The "shock" is not to the global economy; it is to Western complacency.
Third, the argument is self-contradictory. The critics want China to be simultaneously weak enough to dismiss and strong enough to fear. If China's high-tech development is genuinely formidable - so innovative and efficient that it threatens to displace developed economies - then it is delivering precisely the technological progress the world needs to meet climate goals. Restricting it through tariffs and barriers would harm global innovation, raise energy costs for developing countries, and slow decarbonization. The critics would be sacrificing the planet to protect their own complacency.
"China Shock 2.0" is a rhetorical device to justify protectionism. It replaces engagement with containment, competition with confrontation. The world does not need another shock doctrine. It needs cooperation, investment, and the recognition that China's rise is not a threat but an opportunity - for green transition, for technological progress, for shared prosperity, and for a shared future. 
The author is a professor of politics and international relations and director of the Center for Ecological Civilization at East China Normal University in Shanghai. [email protected] 
。”这样的感慨，正是钱塘（新）区以项目攻坚撬动有效投资的生动缩影。近日，2026年二季度全省投资“赛马”激励地区名单公布，钱塘（新）区再度上榜，成为杭州市唯一连续两个季度获此殊荣的区县。今年上半年，钱塘（新）区完成固定资产投资365亿元，同比增长7.6%，增速居全市第二；制造业投资增长30.7%，连续19个季度霸榜全市第一。更令人振奋的是，项目投资、产业投资、高新技术产业投资全部实现两位数增长，结构优化成色十足。省“千项万亿”项目方面，该区第一批及动态增补批次累计入库38个，数量居全市第二，总投资达669.5亿元；投资完成率更是拿下全市第一、全省第二的佳绩，8个新建项目全部按期开工。资金要素争取同样表现抢眼，累计争取到资金超62亿元，位居全市前列。

B | 项目推进“加速度”来自哪里？首先得益于钱塘（新）区对项目全生命周期的数字化管控——依托全市项目全生命周期平台和产业项目全流程管理系统，该区为重点项目建起从签约到投产的全过程跟踪档案，其中三色预警模块堪称“火眼金睛”：系统对审批、开工、竣工等关键节点实施红、绿、黄三色精准预警，哪个环节亮“红灯”、哪个节点进度滞后，大屏上一目了然，相关部门第一时间介入协调，把卡顿扼杀在萌芽里。数字化“盯防”之外，更有服务专班的“陪跑”暖意。顶正包材绿色智慧包材产业化项目同样是省“千项万亿”项目，开工前却因企业对“能评”申报流程不熟悉，在能耗指标核算、节能报告编制等环节一筹莫展。对此，该区发展改革局专班人员拎着文件袋直奔企业，逐一梳理堵点难点。

C | 从指标核算到报告编制，从方案打磨到上级对接，每个流程都“手把手”带着企业走过去。很快，批复文件正式下达，项目如期推进。线上数字“盯防”，线下专班“陪跑”，背后更有一套“周监测、月调度、季复盘”的硬核机制在持续发力。今年以来，钱塘（新）区已落地市考产业项目59个，其中10亿元以上8个；同步召开各类协调会20余场，专项工作组开展协调99次，归集并解决问题131个，用实打实的行动为项目落地“清障开路”。接下来，钱塘（新）区将继续锚定服务靠前一步、攻坚更深一层，以更大的力度扩大有效投资优势，为全省全市高质量发展作出更大贡献。